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Public concern about the environment increased in the late 1980s, reinforced by 
scientific discoveries regarding phenomena such as ozone depletion and weather 
patterns that seemed to indicate that global warming had already begun. The obvious 
solution was to tighten environmental regulations and it was in this political context 
of demands for a new environmental ethic, political change and tighter environmental 
regulations that business groups and economists looked for market solutions to 
environmental problems that would accommodate economic growth, harness and 
exonerate the profit motive, and avoid further legislation and regulation.  
Business-funded conservative think tanks in English-speaking nations, which 
were pro-market and anti-regulation, disparaged environmental legislation – labelling 
it ‘command and control’ – and recommended using the market to allocate scarce 
environmental resources such as wilderness and clean air. They argued that 
legislation should be replaced with voluntary industry agreements, reinforced or 
newly created property rights, and economic incentives.  
The Washington-based Cato Institute, for example, stated that one of its main 
focuses in the area of natural resources was ‘dismantling the morass of centralized 
command-and-control environmental regulation and substituting in its place market-
oriented regulatory structures...’i According to Heritage Foundation’s policy analyst, 
John Shanahan, the free market is a conservation mechanism. He urged the use of 
markets and property rights ‘where possible to distribute environmental ‘goods’ 
efficiently and equitably’ rather than legislation.ii 
Think tank economists emphasised the importance of market processes in 
determining optimal resource use. Anderson and Leal argued that the political process 
is inefficient, that is it doesn’t reach the optimal level of pollution where costs are 
minimised: ‘If markets produce “too little” clean water because dischargers do not 
have to pay for its use, then political solutions are equally likely to produce “too much” 
clean water because those who enjoy the benefits do not pay the cost.’iii 
Under pressure from business groups and influenced by think tanks, various 
governments began to consider the use of market instruments. They were concerned 
that tighter pollution control measures might inhibit economic growth. They believed 
that market and property rights-based approaches to environmental protection could 
achieve environmental goals at less cost, providing new sources of finance and 
allowing industry to find its own cost-effective ways of reducing pollution.iv The 
changing consensus wrought by conservatives meant that property rights-based 
instruments, once solely associated with market economists and conservative 
bureaucrats, became widely accepted by government policymakers throughout the 
world.  
Property rights-based measures ‘create rights to use environmental resources, or 
to pollute the environment, up to a pre-determined limit’, and allow these rights to be 
traded.v The idea of these measures is that if people have a right to the use of 
particular natural resources, they will consider the longer term and manage those 
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resources sustainably. Also, the more scarce these rights and the more demand there 
is for them, the more they will cost and this will ensure that the rights are used in the 
most efficient way and will not be squandered. Additionally, it is assumed that those 
who can earn the most money from using such rights will be willing to pay the most 
for them and so the resource will end up being put to the highest value use. 
Property-rights measures include emissions trading where the right to discharge 
a certain amount of pollution is allocated to individual firms, sometimes for a price, 
and markets are set up to allow those rights to be bought and sold. They also include 
tradeable fishing rights which limit who can fish and how much they can catch by 
allocating individual quotas and encouraging the trading of these quotas.  
Trading of water property rights is used in some countries to control and allocate 
water use. It requires the separation of water rights from land title so that water 
rights can be separately traded. Mitigation banking and conservation banking are 
used to create property rights out of conservation work so that credits for conservation 
of private land can be bought and traded for the right to degrade the environment 
somewhere else. Examples include wetland mitigation banking in the US and 
biobanking in NSW, Australia. 
 
Effectiveness 
Property-based environmental instruments may be effective at limiting economic costs 
but they have proven to have limited effectiveness when it comes to protecting the 
environment. This is not a result of poor implementation but an inevitable 
consequence of using property rights-based measures to protect the environment. 
Tradeable pollution rights, or emissions trading, ‘encourage change by those who 
can achieve the change most cheaply’,vi which is fine, if only limited pollution 
reductions are required – that is if reductions can be limited to what can be done 
cheaply. However they tend not to work if substantial reductions are required. 
The US EPA notes that water pollution trading works best when ‘the necessary 
levels of pollutant reduction are not so large that all sources in the watershed must 
reduce as much as possible to achieve the total reduction needed – in this case there 
may not be enough surplus reductions to sell or purchase’.vii  
If substantial pollution reductions are necessary then more expensive reductions 
also have to be made and there is little point in setting up markets that enable some 
firms to avoid making those expensive reductions so as to minimise overall costs. This 
became evident in Germany when it considered implementing an acid rain emissions 
programme. The aim of the German programme was a 90 percent reduction in SO2 
between 1983 and 1998. In comparison, the aim of the US emissions trading program 
which was set up in 1990 was only a 50 percent reduction by 2010. This meant that in 
the US there was much more scope for power stations to find cheaper ways to reduce 
their emissions, whereas in Germany, every power station had little choice but to 
retrofit their plants with flue gas desulphurisation and selective catalytic reduction for 
nitrogen oxides. This meant that there was no scope for trading.viii  
In other words, the more rigorous the emission reduction required the less scope 
there is to find cheap solutions and sell excess allowances or reduction credits.  
The US Acid Rain Cap and Trade scheme is consistently cited as a success 
because it has achieved some reductions at minimal cost but how do those reductions 
compare with what can be achieved with traditional regulation? ‘US sulphur 
emissions now exceed those from the EU Member States by 150%’.ix Even according to 
its champion, the US EPA: 
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The Acid Rain Program has enjoyed an unusually high level of emission 
reductions and near-perfect compliance. However, it is becoming 
increasingly clear that the program’s emission targets may not be sufficient 
to achieve its environmental goal of ecosystem recovery.x 
Similarly transferable fishing quotas have seldom prevented the decline of commercial 
fishing species. According to the Australian Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Forestry (DAFF) the M, spawning stock are severely depleted, and ‘current catches 
severely limit probability of rebuilding’.xi  
Although the orange roughy fishery in NZ was often cited as a case study of the 
success of tradeable fishing quotas, it has now actually turned out to be a failure. By 
2000 ‘[t]wo roughy fisheries have collapsed, and most are now at 10% of their original 
populations’.xii  
 Despite having a cap and trade system for water allocation since 1997 the 
Murray River in Australia is dying. More than 75 percent of the river system water is 
still diverted before it reaches the sea which has caused serious environmental 
problems, especially at the mouth of the river, where there has seldom been any river 
flow since 2001.xiii 
In 2001 a National Research Council study found that mitigation banking in the 
US was not preventing loss of wetlands.xiv Although the ratio of destroyed wetlands to 
compensatory wetlands is around 100 to 178, ‘only about 19 ha’ of those 178 were 
‘judged functionally equivalent to appropriate reference sites.’ So wetland mitigation 
banking results in significant net loss of wetland function.xv Another study by the 
Washington State Department of Ecology found that only three compensatory 
wetland-mitigation projects out of 24 (at 31 sites) were fully successful.xvi In the case 
of conservation banks, no study has been done into their effectiveness.xvii  
 
Efficiency vs Environment 
Despite the win-win rhetoric, property rights measures tend to favour economic 
efficiency over environmental effectiveness. That is, they aim to achieve a given level 
of environmental protection at less cost to industry and developers, and to enable 
continued economic growth despite restrictions.  
Even proponents of emission trading admit that there will inevitably be a conflict 
and an implicit trade-off between the goals of reducing costs and improving 
environmental quality.xviii This conflict can be seen in the setting of baseline standards 
or caps for tradeable emissions programmes. What is good for the environment is not 
necessarily good for encouraging trade in a market. If the cap is too low and too few 
allowances are issued, or the baseline standard is too low, there will be few allowances 
or reduction credits for sale—because few firms will be able to reduce their pollution 
levels below the allowances they are allocated or the emissions standards set. Yet a 
such a low cap may be necessary to protect the environment.  
Political factors are also influential, as they are with legislation. Nutrient trading 
hasn’t really taken off in the US partly because caps on nutrient levels are not strict 
enough to force point sources to buy allowances from farmers. However stricter caps 
are not imposed because they would be politically unpopular with the industrial 
polluters that would be the buyers.  
When the EU greenhouse gas emissions trading system was introduced in 2005 
many governments were too generous in allocating allowances to local firms because 
they feared their local industries would be at a competitive disadvantage if they had to 
buy extra allowances. A study by Ilex Energy Consulting for WWF examining six EU 
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countries found that none of them had set caps that went beyond business as usual.xix 
Because allowances were not in great demand, the market opened at 8 euros per tonne 
and settled around 23 euros a few months later, far less than would be necessary to 
provide an incentive to reduce emissions.xx  
Tradeable fishing quota systems also focus on efficiency, their aim being to make 
the fleet more economically efficient. The idea that a smaller, more efficient fleet will 
reduce overfishing is faulted however. What happens in practice is that the smaller 
‘inefficient’ boats are priced out of the market but those that remain more than make 
up for this reduction in fishing fleet size with their extra boat size, power and 
technology. The technologies they use can be far more damaging to the environment. 
The larger boats favoured by tradeable fishing quota systems ‘fish more 
intensively’ and therefore impact more on the marine environment, particularly ‘on 
sensitive areas such as coral reefs’.xxi Fishers who use line and hook have been 
progressively eliminated while there are more and more large vessels which tend to 
drag heavy fishing gear across the ocean floor killing crustaceans, uprooting aquatic 
plants, ‘eroding plants and benthic life, levelling the ground and destroying shelter for 
the young – in short, transforming the bottom of the sea into a lifeless desert’.xxii  
Tradeable fishing quotas can also cause a displacement effect: when fishers are 
forced out of one fishery they often move into another. In the case of the southern 
bluefin tuna fishery in Australia, when the tradeable quota system was introduced the 
number of boats seeking bluefin tuna was reduced by 70 percent in two years but 
many of the boats that once sought bluefin tuna now fished in other fisheries, some of 
which were already being overfished.xxiii  
When tradeable quota systems are being proposed there is an incentive for 
existing fishers to catch as much as possible and report they are catching more than 
they actually are, so that when quotas are allocated, based on their past catches, they 
will get a larger quota. This is referred to as ‘speculative fishing-for-history’. This not 
only impacts directly on the sustainability of the fisheries but distorts the figures used 
by fisheries managers to estimate what catches are sustainable. Also, vessels that 
might have been retired are kept on in the hope of getting saleable quotas.xxiv In NZ, 
fishers put greater effort into catching species of fish not in the Quota Management 
System (QMS) in anticipation of their inclusion.xxv  
The economic goals of a functioning water market also conflict with the goals of a 
healthy ecosystem. An over-allocated river system threatens the environment, but if 
there are not enough spare water entitlements, there will be no trade.xxvi 
In any water trading system there is an ongoing conflict between the needs of 
irrigators and the needs of the environment. Irrigators demand certainty about how 
much water they will have so that they can plan ahead and safely invest in irrigation 
infrastructure. However rainfall varies and any certainty provided to irrigators, 
creates problems for ecosystems, particularly in times of drought when the surplus 
water is not available.  
Water allowances are sometimes based on a proportional share of available water 
so that they decrease in times of low water flow and regulators can take account of 
environmental needs when deciding the total amount that can be withdrawn. However 
farmers generally oppose such systems because they cannot know how much water 
will be available in future. Even where entitlements are proportional, governments 
are wary of reducing the total water allocation too much because of irrigator 
opposition.xxvii  
In the case of the Murray River, for example, the logical thing to do is to reduce 
entitlements to a level that is compatible with a healthy river ecosystem. However, 
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governments go out of their way to please irrigators in Australia. In 2003 the Federal 
government moved, as part of its National Water Initiative, to increase the security of 
irrigators water entitlements.xxviii In 2005 the NSW government was accused of 
‘plundering water set aside to preserve one of the Murray River’s most important 
wetland forests to top up irrigator’s allowances’.xxix  
Economists argue that any reduction of entitlements ‘undermines the market 
process and prevents permanent water entitlements moving to their highest-value 
use’.xxx Compensation to rights holders, or buy back of water rights, can make water 
markets the most expensive way of meeting environmental objectives, particularly to 
the tax payer, rather than the most cost effective. Yet once water rights are allocated, 
only the direct purchase of water provides any certainty that the required amount of 
water will be left in the rivers and the cost of this can severely test government resolve 
to protect the environment. 
The conflict between economic and environmental goals are also inherent in 
mitigation and conservation banks. Problems associated with creating, enhancing and 
restoring wetlands, habitats or streams are exacerbated by the fact that mitigation 
banks are usually driven by profit, rather than scientific curiosity or environmental 
goals, and the owners are seldom willing to spend the time and money trying to get it 
right.xxxi ‘Studies that have evaluated mitigation projects have shown that the type of 
habitat to be created or restored is often determined not on the basis of the ecological 
need or the habitat lost, but on the basis of cost, ease of construction, aesthetics, and 
provision of non-habitat functions.’xxxii 
An early study found that the only wetland type that was increasing in the US 
was ‘open water pond with a fringe of wetland vegetation’ because that is the type that 
is easiest and cheapest to create. This type of wetland mitigation is allowed even in 
places where it does not naturally occur.xxxiii  
Because rural land is cheaper than urban or suburban land, mitigation and 
conservation banks tend to result in conservation efforts being concentrated in rural 
areas whilst urban areas become more developed. This means that urban areas 
progressively lose every pocket of nature.xxxiv Stream mitigation banks, for example, 
favour the restoration of rural streams whilst developers tend to destroy urban 
streams. Urban streams are more expensive to restore and are subject to urban runoff 
so are more difficult to maintain. Also, larger rivers cost more to restore because they 
are wider and cover a greater area, have a larger floodplain, and are in areas of higher 
population density.xxxv 
If trades are confined to areas that are of similar ecosystem types to avoid the 
problems resulting from working out equivalencies, then trades are too restricted and 
the market will not work.xxxvi This is a clear example of how the compromises 
necessary to ensure a viable market are often made at the expense of the environment.  
 
Monitoring Difficulties 
Emissions trading increases the incentive to cheat because claimed reductions are 
worth money.xxxvii Environmental groups sued a number of companies in the LA 
emissions trading program, including United Airlines and the Southern California 
Gas Company, for failing to purchase sufficient credits to cover their pollution. The 
problem was that the regulator simply verified transactions after they had been made, 
often doing little more than checking the paper work because of a lack of personnel 
and resources to check each claimed reduction.xxxviii 
Often, in emissions trading schemes, companies do not report actual measured 
emissions but estimated emissions based on models that are far from accurate. Such 
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models under-estimated oil company emissions by factors of between 10 and 1000 but 
such estimates were accepted by the regulatory authorities.xxxix 
The difficulties of monitoring and enforcing emissions trading programmes is 
multiplied many times when it comes to monitoring emissions and claimed reductions 
worldwide as well as ‘countless transactions around the globe that are brokered by far 
removed “middle men”.’xl This is particularly the case in developing countries where 
the regulatory infrastructure and skilled personnel to measure and monitor emissions 
reductions may not be well developed.xli 
It is also a problem in affluent countries because monitoring is often neglected: 
‘As brokers, consultants, accountants, speculators, energy corporations and politicians 
all scramble for a piece of the emissions trading pie, no equivalent level of activity is 
seen from credible verifiers or monitors.’xlii Where emissions reductions are verified, it 
is often done by transnational corporations such as PricewaterhouseCoopers that are 
also consultants and accountants to the companies whose emissions they are 
auditing.xliii  
A major problem with assigning credits for emissions reductions is not knowing 
whether they would  have occurred without nay credits being awarded. Companies 
were given millions of dollars in incentives to take part in the UK’s voluntary emission 
trading scheme. An independent non-government group, Environmental Data Services 
(ENDS), found that three of the chemical companies including DuPont claimed credit 
for reductions that they had been required to make previously under EU laws. In 
addition to the millions they got in tax payer incentives, they made millions from 
selling the credits they did not deserve. It has also been alleged that other companies 
have claimed phoney reductions that have resulted from plant closures and ‘securing a 
baseline against a “false” projection of economic activity which exaggerates output and 
hence emissions’.xliv 
In NSW the Greenhouse Abatement Scheme issues certificates to those who 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions that can then be sold to electricity retailers who have 
to meet mandatory emissions reductions. However a study by researchers at the 
University of NSW has found that 95 percent of the certificates issued in the 18 
months leading up to June 2004 were for projects established before the introduction 
of the scheme and more than 70% were awarded for emissions reductions that would 
have occurred anyway.xlv  
An oft-cited example of ‘hot air’ or ‘phantom’ emissions reductions has been the 
trading of emissions credits with Russia and other eastern European countries that 
are in economic decline. This has meant that some countries in Eastern Europe are 
already emitting 30%-45% less carbon dioxide than in 1990 because of lowered 
production yet they can sell their rights to emissions they were not going to make, to 
the US or Japan in return for hard currency, with no net benefit to the planet.xlvi Now 
that many more nations are going into recession, it is a concern that the resulting 
reductions in emissions will be turned into undeserved credits that lower the price of 
polluting or are banked for the future. 
Lack of monitoring is also a problem with water allowance markets.xlvii One 
problem is water poaching, which has become more of a temptation as the price of 
water has increased. Given the choice between taking more water than they are 
allowed or risking the failure of a crop and the possibility of losing the farm, many are 
going to take more water.xlviii  
Fishing quota trading systems also provide an incentive to cheat. Underreporting 
an individual catch profits an individual fisher, as does poaching and exceeding 
quotas. Illegal ways of exceeding one’s quota include ‘fishing out of season and selling 
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fish on the black market, which are widespread in many, if not most, industrialized 
fisheries. The quantities involved can be quite considerable’.xlix There are also cases of 
catch misreporting, for example where a valuable quota species such as cod is reported 
as another species such as saithe.l  
The idea that ownership of fishing rights would ensure that quota owners would 
police each other is negated by the shift of ownership from owner-operators to 
investors who pay others to fish for them. Contract fishers have much less incentive to 
report illegal fishing by others, particularly if they are doing it themselves.li On top of 
this, poaching of fish has increased because those dispossessed by not having a quota 
and those feeling their allocated quota is unfair feel justified in taking what they 
believe they deserve.lii 
The increase of fishing vessels that process the fish at sea also ‘provides an 
opportunity to bend the fisheries management rules’. Some commentators have 
pointed to the way such vessels manage to get a higher yield per catch than land-
based factories as evidence that some cheating is occurring. Large trawlers have also 
been caught landing some of their catch in other countries. For example, Icelandic 
trawlers taking fish to Germany and Britain.liii 
 Certification, verification and monitoring is a particular problem for 
conservation markets because of the difficulty of measuring biodiversity. In fact 
wetland offsets are often defined in terms of acreage rather than function and ‘the 
area of wetland type is often used as a proxy for wetland functions’.liv The use of a 
measure like acreage for wetlands or linear measures for streams ‘have the major 
advantage of keeping trades simple, reducing transaction costs, and ensuring that all 
parties understand the transaction that is taking place’. They are necessary to ensure 
that markets work. Comprehensive measures that take account of various biological 
criteria such as ‘habitat quality, species, conservation values and benefits’ are 
expensive to work out and raise more questions than they answer in terms of 
equivalencies for trading purposes.lv  
Mitigation banks are seldom monitored for the full time it takes for restored or 
created wetlands to reach complete functional performance, which may be 20 years or 
more. ‘Habitat for swamp dwelling animals that require a closed tree canopy could 
take decades to develop, unless mature trees are already present or are planted.’lvi  
Enforcement of compliance conditions is poor in the US where monitoring is often 
fairly superficial and does not include assessment of function.lvii Fourteen percent of 
banks do not even have specified monitoring and maintenance provisions.lviii 
Functional assessment is even rarer. Often all that is required is a specified level of 
plant cover, even though the existence and survival of the right vegetation is not 
sufficient to indicate whether the wetland is functioning as it should.lix 
 
Perpetuating Damaging Industries 
Emissions trading tends to protect very polluting or dirty industries by allowing them 
to buy emission rights rather than meet higher environmental standards. In this way, 
trading can reduce the pressure on companies to change production processes and 
introduce other measures to reduce their emissions. It may be preferable in the long 
run for firms that cannot make the environmental grade to go out of business and 
make way for other firms that can produce substitute products in a cleaner way rather 
than allow them to pay to continue polluting.  
The oil and fossil fuel dependent companies who want to continue expanding 
their businesses are the very ones that are promoting emissions trading in the 
knowledge that it will enable them to continue to do this. As Joshua Karliner points 
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out, ‘Market based solutions will not cause a fundamental shift away from fossil fuels 
and toward renewable energy’.lx  
Whilst water trading seeks to ensure the highest value crops are grown, there is 
no guarantee that those crops are the most environmentally beneficial. They may 
require more chemicals to grow and therefore be worse for the environment in the long 
run.lxi Nor does water trading ensure that less water-dependent crops are grown. For 
example, in Australia rice growers are less vulnerable to the higher water prices than 
other farmers, even though rice is one of the most water intensive crops.lxii  
As water prices have increased, farmers have built dams on their property to 
capture and store the rain: ‘In Victoria alone, there are said to be about 90,000 dams, 
and for every meg [ML] held in the dam, between one and three are lost to the system 
in evaporation.’ This means that less water is available to rivers despite caps on total 
water diversions. In NSW the government attempted to deal with this problem by 
allowing farmers to keep only ten percent of the rain that fell on their land for free, 
leading to claims that the government was privatising the rain.lxiii 
The other problem is that when farmers have to pay more for their water they do 
not necessarily use less but rather they work out ways to get the water to cover 
greater areas of crops, that is expanding the area of irrigation for the same amount of 
water. What is more, efficient methods of utilising water, like drip irrigation, return 
much less water to the river. Therefore increased water efficiency does not necessarily 
benefit river flows.lxiv 
Mitigation banks facilitate poor development practices because they allow 
developers to destroy and degrade wetlands and endangered species habitats by 
simply paying for conservation elsewhere that may or may not be successful and does 
not add to the aggregate amount of species habitat.lxv The concern is that with such an 
option increasingly available the pressure on developers to pick appropriate 
development sites and avoid or minimise the environmental damage they cause will be 
reduced.lxvi 
The Australian peak environmental groups argue that biobanking schemes ‘use 
habitat destruction or pollution of the environment as a “driver” for environmental 
conservation and improvement’. The groups point out that landowners have a duty of 
care to manage vegetation on their land and the fact that they do this should not be 
traded off against ‘further land degradation’. This may even provide an incentive for 
landowners to let the conservation value of their land be degraded – through lack of 
care and poor management – so as to be eligible for claiming payment for undertaking 
normal, accepted land management practices as offsets for damage elsewhere. 
Similarly, conservation actions that are supposed to be core business for local 
governments – such as catchment  maintenance, improvement and rectification – may 
be used as offsets for environmental damage elsewhere.lxvii 
In Western Australia, where environmental offsets have been used as an 
environmental management tool since the 1980s, the Environmental Protection 
Authority (EPA) has critically observed that environmental offsets are perceived as 
‘being used to make otherwise “unacceptable” adverse environmental impacts 
“acceptable” within government’. lxviii  
 
Conclusion 
Property rights-based measures have enabled the corporate neo-liberal agenda of 
deregulation, privatisation and an unconstrained market to be dressed up as an 
environmental virtue but they are a poor way of protecting the environment. Markets 
are unreliable and unpredictable and this is even more so when they are designed so 
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that environmental protection is supposed to be a by-product of profit-seeking activity. 
When economic growth is paramount and the seeking of private gain encouraged, the 
environment is easily compromised and property rights-based instruments do not 
change these priorities but are designed to accommodate them.  
Property rights-based instruments require onerous regulation because of the 
powerful incentives to cheat, yet because they are so often promoted  as an alternative 
to direct regulation, property rights-based schemes are poorly regulated. Moreover, 
such schemes are far more difficult to regulate than traditional legislation because 
they involve numerous transactions between private parties. 
Worst of all, property rights-based approaches tend to shift much of the decision-
making power with respect to environmental outcomes from the political – and 
therefore public sphere – to the private sphere. This means that individual businesses 
can decide to continue with their environmentally damaging practices so long as they 
pay for credits or offsets. Far from promoting innovation, property rights-based 
measures tend to enable companies to avoid substantial changes to their operations. 
This is because property rights-based approaches are introduced with the idea of 
limiting costs to industry and when costs are limited the incentive to innovate is 
small. 
Property rights-based environmental instruments serve an ideological need to 
make a virtue of markets; a political need to reduce government intervention in the 
operations of private companies; and a business need to limit costs and risks whilst 
continuing business as usual. They do not serve the critical need for significant 
reductions in human impacts on the environment.  
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